Cortex RSS feed: Current Issue. CORTEX is an international journal devoted to the study of cognition and of the relationship between the nervous system and mental processes, particularly as these are reflected in the behaviour of patients with acquired brain lesions, normal volunteers, children with typical and atypical development, and in the activation of brain regions and systems as recorded by functional neuroimaging techniques. It was founded in 1964 by Ennio De Renzi. http://www.cortexjournal.net/?rss=yesElsevier Inc.en © 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Cortex0010-9452483March 2012 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. healthpermissions@elsevier.comhttp://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945212000111/abstract?rss=yesCover Figure10.1016/S0010-9452(12)00011-1Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2012-03-01Cortex2012-03-01483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9e1e1http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945212000123/abstract?rss=yesEditorial Board/Title Page10.1016/S0010-9452(12)00012-3Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2012-03-01Cortex2012-03-01483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9iihttp://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945212000147/abstract?rss=yesContents10.1016/S0010-9452(12)00014-7Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2012-03-01Cortex2012-03-01483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9iiiivhttp://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211002917/abstract?rss=yesCortex was created in 1964 by Ennio De Renzi and a group of scientists of the “Milan group” supported by a strong international editorial board, including most of the founders of modern neuropsychology. At the time, neuropsychology began to be conceived as an interdisciplinary science based on the methods of experimental psychology and neuroscience (). Together with Neuropsychologia, which was founded a year before, the journal has not only survived for almost 50years but it has been enjoying an upsurge of interest. This suggests that the multidisciplinary approach of the journal and the breadth of topics it covers are paying off. Cortex was originally defined as “an international journal devoted to the study of cognition and of the relationship between the nervous system and mental processes”, and more recently its remits have been qualified to underline that these “mental processes” encompass particularly those “reflected in the behaviour of patients with acquired brain lesions, normal volunteers, children with typical and atypical development, and in the activation of brain regions and systems as recorded by functional neuroimaging techniques”.Cortex aims and vision10.1016/j.cortex.2011.11.007Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-12-12Cortex2011-12-12483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Editorial293293http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211001729/abstract?rss=yesAbstract: A controversial issue in the cognitive neuroscience of language is the question whether independent lexical representations need to be included in cognitive models. Recent models claim to account for the available data without including phonological or orthographic lexicons. These models base their lexical decision (“Is it a word or not?”) either on familiarity of the input string or alternatively, on semantic information. These two alternatives were evaluated in a series of experiments with an individual suffering from word-meaning deafness. This is a rare disorder of auditory word comprehension which affects mapping of a word’s phonology to its meaning. The participant, BB, was unaffected by the ‘word-likeness’ of nonwords with comparable accuracy for plausible and abstruse nonwords. She was further able to make lexical decisions despite her severe impairment in comprehending the word’s meaning. Lexical and semantic processing were assessed on an item-specific basis providing a methodological advancement over previous studies. The comprehension tasks involved word-picture matching as well as definition tasks. The results suggest that BB’s lexical decisions are based neither on familiarity of the input string nor on semantic information, which was largely unavailable. The only alternative are lexical representations on which she could base her decisions.“Are there lexicons?” A study of lexical and semantic processing in word-meaning deafness suggests “yes”Tobias Bormann, Cornelius Weiller10.1016/j.cortex.2011.06.003Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-07-15Cortex2011-07-15483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Research Reports294307http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945210002388/abstract?rss=yesAbstract: Introduction: Prosody has been little studied in the primary progressive aphasias (PPAs), a group of neurodegenerative disorders presenting with progressive language impairment.Methods: Here we conducted a systematic investigation of different dimensions of prosody processing (acoustic, linguistic and emotional) in a cohort of 19 patients with nonfluent PPA syndromes (11 with progressive nonfluent aphasia, PNFA; five with progressive logopenic/phonological aphasia, LPA; three with progranulin-associated aphasia, GRN-PPA) compared with a group of healthy older controls. Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) was used to identify neuroanatomical associations of prosodic functions.Results: Broadly comparable receptive prosodic deficits were exhibited by the PNFA, LPA and GRN-PPA subgroups, for acoustic, linguistic and affective dimensions of prosodic analysis. Discrimination of prosodic contours was significantly more impaired than discrimination of simple acoustic cues, and discrimination of intonation was significantly more impaired than discrimination of stress at phrasal level. Recognition of vocal emotions was more impaired than recognition of facial expressions for the PPA cohort, and recognition of certain emotions (in particular, disgust and fear) was relatively more impaired than others (sadness, surprise). VBM revealed atrophy associated with acoustic and linguistic prosody impairments in a distributed cortical network including areas likely to be involved in perceptual analysis of vocalisations (posterior temporal and inferior parietal cortices) and working memory (fronto-parietal circuitry). Grey matter associations of emotional prosody processing were identified for negative emotions (disgust, fear, sadness) in a broadly overlapping network of frontal, temporal, limbic and parietal areas.Conclusions: Taken together, the findings show that receptive prosody is impaired in nonfluent PPA syndromes, and suggest a generic early perceptual deficit of prosodic signal analysis with additional relatively specific deficits (recognition of particular vocal emotions).Receptive prosody in nonfluent primary progressive aphasiasJonathan D. Rohrer, Disa Sauter, Sophie Scott, Martin N. Rossor, Jason D. Warren10.1016/j.cortex.2010.09.004Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2010-11-03Cortex2010-11-03483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Research Reports308316http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211000165/abstract?rss=yesAbstract: Introduction: We investigated whether pre-surgical patients with temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) forget verbal and non-verbal material faster than healthy controls over retention intervals of an hour and 6 weeks, and whether any observed memory loss was associated with structural changes to the hippocampus and/or seizure frequency.Methods: A mixed factorial design compared the performance of 27 patients with TLE and 22 healthy control participants, matched for IQ, age and gender, on tests of story recall and complex figure recall at three delays: immediate, 1h and 6 weeks. Performance of the patient and control groups was matched at the immediate delay, which enabled comparisons of forgetting rate over the longer delays.Results: We found that TLE can affect the acquisition and retention of new memories over a relatively short delay of 1h. This deficit was associated with structural hippocampal abnormality, with a material-specific effect that was particularly evident for the verbal task. We also found evidence of accelerated long-term forgetting in both patient groups, for the verbal and non-verbal tasks. It was demonstrated most strongly on the verbal task by the patients with right lateralized hippocampal sclerosis whose verbal recall was normal at the 1-h delay. Accelerated long-term forgetting was not associated with hippocampal pathology, but was associated with the frequency of epileptic seizures.Discussion: The findings from the verbal task in particular provide evidence consistent with an extended period of memory consolidation that can be disrupted by both left and right TLE. The material-specific effects at the 1-h delay only, suggest that the initial consolidation of verbal and non-verbal, information depends on the integrity of the left and right hippocampus, respectively.Long-term accelerated forgetting of verbal and non-verbal information in temporal lobe epilepsyHeather Wilkinson, Juliet S. Holdstock, Gus Baker, Andrea Herbert, Fiona Clague, John J. Downes10.1016/j.cortex.2011.01.002Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-03-14Cortex2011-03-14483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Research Reports317332http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945210002984/abstract?rss=yesAbstract: Visual masking and visual suppression by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) are both widely utilized in cognitive neuroscience to investigate a wide range of processes. However, the neural processes affected by visual masking and TMS remain unclear. We compared para- and metacontrast masking with TMS-induced suppression of visibility in a within-subjects design where participants were asked to detect and rate the visibility of a stimulus. TMS pulses applied 75–109msec after the onset of the visual stimulus reduced the subjective visibility of the target. Even when the TMS pulses completely eliminated the conscious perception of the target, unconscious location detection was possible. The visual masking condition yielded similar results: metacontrast did not eliminate unconscious location detection even when the target was reported not seen at all. As the first target-related signals were likely to reach the visual cortex before TMS pulses started to modulate target visibility, we suggest that TMS and metacontrast masking affected neural signals subsequent to the target’s transient onset-response. This implies that a preserved onset-response is sufficient for unconscious processing of stimulus attributes, but not for conscious perception.Two means of suppressing visual awareness: A direct comparison of visual masking and transcranial magnetic stimulationHenry Railo, Mika Koivisto10.1016/j.cortex.2010.12.001Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-01-13Cortex2011-01-13483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Research Reports333343http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211000190/abstract?rss=yesAbstract: Introduction: Even though people with congenital prosopagnosia (CP) never develop a normal ability to “overtly” recognize faces, some individuals show indices of “covert” (or implicit) face recognition. The aim of this study was to demonstrate covert face recognition in CP when participants could not overtly recognize the faces.Methods: Eleven people with CP completed three tasks assessing their overt face recognition ability, and three tasks assessing their “covert” face recognition: a Forced choice familiarity task, a Forced choice cued task, and a Priming task.Results: Evidence of covert recognition was observed with the Forced choice familiarity task, but not the Priming task. In addition, we propose that the Forced choice cued task does not measure covert processing as such, but instead “provoked-overt” recognition.Conclusions: Our study clearly shows that people with CP demonstrate covert recognition for faces that they cannot overtly recognize, and that behavioural tasks vary in their sensitivity to detect covert recognition in CP.Covert face recognition in congenital prosopagnosia: A group studyDavide Rivolta, Romina Palermo, Laura Schmalzl, Max Coltheart10.1016/j.cortex.2011.01.005Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-02-17Cortex2011-02-17483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Research Reports344352http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS001094521100205X/abstract?rss=yesThe need of appropriate methodological approaches in cognitive neuropsychology has been repeatedly addressed for over 30years. Most of the debate has focused on whether single-case or group studies are more appropriate for drawing inferences with respect to an unimpaired cognitive architecture (e.g., ). This controversy has not been resolved in either direction and, currently, both single-cases and group studies are commonly adopted in neuropsychological research.Neuropsychology is nothing without control: A potential fallacy hidden in clinical studiesMario Bonato, Francesco Sella, Ilaria Berteletti, Carlo Umiltà10.1016/j.cortex.2011.06.017Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-07-25Cortex2011-07-25483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Letters to the Editor353355http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211001481/abstract?rss=yesConfabulation refers to “spontaneous ‘narrative’ reports of events that never happened” in patients with amnesia (). Falsification of stories is the main characteristic of confabulation, and the degree of confabulation is known to increase with a time delay after an event (). Despite abundant reports on verbal confabulation, little is known about the graphic version of confabulation, which can occur during the recall of figures that patients have seen or drawn. A few studies have reported rotation errors in reproducing the Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure (RCFT) (, ), and one of these also showed findings of irrelevant drawing (), which may be a form of graphic confabulation. However, to our knowledge, no study has systemically evaluated graphic confabulation.Graphabulation: A graphic form of confabulationJee H. Roh, Byung H. Lee, Juhee Chin, Geon H. Kim, Duk L. Na10.1016/j.cortex.2011.05.004Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-06-16Cortex2011-06-16483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Letters to the Editor356359http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211000931/abstract?rss=yesEvidence has mounted documenting widespread musician enhancements in an evolutionarily ancient subcortical structure, the auditory brainstem, highlighting the brainstem as a structure involved in learning-related brain plasticity (). Musicians not only show more precise subcortical encoding of music, but of speech and emotional communication sounds as well (). Though remarkable, such observations cannot disambiguate the source of this musician advantage. Does musical training shape subcortical auditory processing, or are individuals born with more refined auditory brainstem function predisposed to pursue musical training? Although neurobiological studies have employed correlational analyses to infer that functional differences between the brains of musicians and nonmusicians are a consequence of the extent of musical practice (), causality cannot be derived from correlations. Given that experience-related and innate factors likely co-exist, we must clearly define their respective roles in shaping brain function in musicians. Here, we aimed to provide unambiguous evidence for musical training’s impact on auditory brainstem function. The answer to this question bears great significance for sensory learning; if musical training has the power to fine-tune subcortical structures to better process sound, this would attest to the power of cognitive experience to shape basic sensory function.Specialization among the specialized: Auditory brainstem function is tuned in to timbreDana L. Strait, Karen Chan, Richard Ashley, Nina Kraus10.1016/j.cortex.2011.03.015Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-05-03Cortex2011-05-03483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Letters to the Editor360362http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211001390/abstract?rss=yesIn the picture–word interference (PWI) task, a variant of the Stroop task, pictures are presented, one at a time, along with a superimposed distractor word. Participants are instructed to name the pictures as quickly and accurately as possible while ignoring the distractor words (). Recently, a theory has been proposed to account for the performance in the PWI: the response-exclusion hypothesis (hereafter REH; ; see also ). The aim of the present work is to test the REH against a set of published data. As it will become evident at the end of the paper, the REH fails the test.Picture–word interference and the response–exclusion hypothesisClaudio Mulatti, Max Coltheart10.1016/j.cortex.2011.04.025Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-06-01Cortex2011-06-01483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Discussion Forum363372http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211002826/abstract?rss=yesIn order for a manipulation of the speed of processing of the distractor (e.g., distractor frequency) to affect the time the response to the target accesses the buffer, it is necessary that the response to the target waits for the buffer to be purged. But this has an unwanted implication: If the response to the target has to wait for the distractor to be purged from the buffer, the benefit that derives from the picture name being of high frequency with respect to being low frequency is cancelled. … An example may illustrate the point.Suppose that Leonardo (low frequency picture) and Michelangelo (high frequency picture) want to talk to Giotto (the buffer), who is in the Scrovegni Chapel. Leonardo and Michelangelo start from the same point to go to Giotto, but Michelangelo can walk much faster than Leonardo, and gets to the Chapel five minutes before Leonardo. If Giotto is immediately available, then Michelangelo will talk to Giotto 5minutes before Leonardo. But if Giotto is busy, for example he is painting (that is, the buffer is occupied), then Michelangelo will have to wait, and the advantage of being able to walk much faster than Leonardo vanishes.(Mulatti and Coltheart, 2012, this issue, p. 363–372)Picture–word interference and the Response-Exclusion Hypothesis: A response to Mulatti and ColtheartBradford Z. Mahon, Frank E. Garcea, Eduardo Navarrete10.1016/j.cortex.2011.10.008Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-11-30Cortex2011-11-30483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Discussion Forum373377http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211001730/abstract?rss=yesThe word paradox is derived from the Greek: the prefix para means contrary or opposed, and doxos means opinion. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary includes amongst its definitions of paradox ‘a seemingly absurd or self-contradictory statement or proposition which, when investigated or explained, may prove to be well-founded or true’. In his philosophical treatise on paradoxes, has highlighted the paradoxical nature of paradoxes themselves – “Paradoxes are fun. In most cases, they are easy to state and immediately provoke one into trying to ‘solve’ them……. Paradoxes are serious…. To grapple with them is not merely to engage in an intellectual game, but to come to grips with key issues” (, p. 1). There are now a number of converging channels of scientific inquiry, across disciplines including the social, biological and physical sciences, that indicate the importance of harnessing paradoxical phenomena to advance our understanding of nature.Paradoxes of the mindNarinder Kapur10.1016/j.cortex.2011.06.004Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-07-21Cortex2011-07-21483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Quotes and Titbits378381http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/PIIS0010945211002401/abstract?rss=yesIn recent years, hypnosis has begun to gain traction as a potentially valuable tool in the increasingly diverse repertoires of cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neuropsychiatry (). Hypnosis consists of a set of procedures beginning with an induction, which involves instructions and suggestions to promote absorption in (i.e., effortless attention towards) the words of the operator. An induction is typically followed by a series of suggestions for alterations in various dimensions of consciousness, perception, action, and cognition. In response to specific hypnotic suggestions, highly suggestible individuals are capable of experiencing marked changes in affect, attention, memory, and perception. Hypnotic suggestions can be used to model psychiatric and neurological conditions or test predictions that are otherwise difficult to address in the laboratory (instrumental research); alternatively, researchers may investigate the phenomenology and mechanisms underlying response to a hypnotic induction and particular suggestions or the determinants of hypnotic suggestibility (intrinsic research) (). As neuroscientific research on hypnosis continues to grow, it becomes increasingly necessary to integrate it with contemporary neurophysiological models of cognition, to ensure that neuroscientists using hypnosis have a sound understanding of its mechanisms, and to critically examine the prospects and limitations of the utilization of hypnotic suggestion as an experimental tool. Taken within this context, Graham Jamieson’s edited volume, Hypnosis and conscious states: A cognitive neuroscience perspective fulfils a much-needed gap in this literature and is a welcome contribution to this nascent area of neuroscience. In what follows, we briefly review the emerging neuroscience of hypnosis through the lens of this book’s chapters.The emerging neuroscience of hypnosisDevin Blair Terhune, Roi Cohen Kadosh10.1016/j.cortex.2011.08.007Cortex 48, 3 (2012)2011-09-22Cortex2011-09-22483S0010-9452(12)X0002-9Book and New Media Review382386